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What  Have We  Learned 
about  Disinflation? 
U.S.  MONETARY  POLICY  since 1979  has been geared  to stopping  inflation. 
It has had considerable  success in doing so, but at a great cost in lost 
output and high unemployment, not only in the United States, but 
throughout  the world. In Europe  unemployment  rose steadily  from 1979 
to 1982 and is expected to rise further  in 1983. In the United States, 
unemployment  rose to 10.7  percent  at the trough  of the recession in the 
fourth  quarter  of 1982,  more  than I1/2  points  above the previous  postwar 
record  reached  at the worst point  of the severe 1975  recession. 
The duration  of economic  weakness in the present  disinflation  period 
distinguishes  it from previous postwar recessions even more than the 
amount  by which unemployment  rose and the level that  unemployment 
reached.  If the brief  bounce-back  in economic activity after  mid-1980  is 
ignored,  the recent U.S. recession lasted twelve quarters.  The previous 
postwar record was the five-quarter  recession of 1974-75. All other 
postwar  recessions had lasted less than a year. By the end of 1983  the 
cumulative  excess of unemployment  over its 1979  level will be about 11 
percentage  point-years, corresponding  to an estimated $700 billion to 
$900  billion  of forgone  GNP in today's prices. 
This severe recession has been accompanied  by a dramatic  slowing 
in the rate  of inflation.  Table 1 summarizes  several  measures  of inflation 
that reflect that slowdown, including  widely used measures of actual 
inflation  rates, which are affected by many special developments not 
closely associated with the underlying  inflation problem, and some 
alternative  measures  of the underlying  inflation  rate. During  the 1978- 
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80 period  a combination  of price  increases  in food and  energy  (and  rising 
interest rates as they affected the shelter component  of the consumer 
price index)  pushed  the actual  inflation  rate  to more  than 10  percent, as 
measured  by any of the principal  price indexes shown in the top half of 
the table. In part  because of the cessation or reversal  of these develop- 
ments, these inflation  rates slowed dramatically  by 1982,  and  even more 
by the first  half  of 1983. 
Both the acceleration  of inflation  and its subsequent  slowdown are 
greatly attenuated in the measures of the underlying inflation rate 
displayed  in the bottom  half of the table. Nonetheless, the slowdown is 
still substantial,  amounting  to 4 to 5'/2 percentage  points between the 
most inflationary  year, 1980,  and  the first  half  of 1983,  using  all measures 
except the volatile producer  price index, which has had a much larger 
swing. 
One important  question raised by this experience is whether the 
disinflation  that has been accomplished  is more than might  have been 
predicted on the basis of historical  experience or whether it is about 
what would have been expected along  with the huge recession that has 
occurred.  The answer to this question, in turn, should shed some light 
on theoretical  issues concerning  how the economy works and on the 
options confronting  policymakers.  In particular,  a central issue to be 
considered  in light  of the experience  of the past  few years is whether  the 
relation  between output  and inflation  will remain  the same when there 
has been a significant  change in the policy regime, such as that which 
occurred  in the fall of 1979. 
Disinflation  Policy and Inflation Models 
One model of the inflation process, the wage norm hypothesis, 
explicitly  distinguishes  between the cyclical variation  in inflation  and  an 
ongoing  norm  rate  of wage increase  around  which the cyclical variation 
takes place.  ' Cyclical  variations  in employment  and inflation  are  jointly 
determined  by the optimal  response  of firms  to variations  in the demand 
for their  output.  Although  expectations  can, in principle,  alter  the wage 
1. George L. Perry, "Inflation  in Theory  and Practice,"  BPEA, 1:1980,  pp. 207-41; 
and Arthur M.  Okun,  Prices  and  Quantities: A  Macroeconomic  Analysis  (Brookings 
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norm,  in practice  this hypothesis  relates  historical  changes in the norm 
to experienced,  rather  than  anticipated,  changes  in the economy. 
In a wage norm  equation,  shifts  in the norm,  such as those that  would 
arise from sustained  episodes of inflation  or economic slack, show up 
empirically  as shifts  in the constant  term.  The  coefficients  relating  output 
and inflation  in the short  run  are determined  by institutional  and  behav- 
ioral  characteristics  that are largely  unaffected  by changes in macroec- 
onomic  policies  or  by changes  in the wage  norm  itself. In  empirical  work, 
I have modeled  historical  norms  as stable  except for occasional discon- 
tinuous shifts.2 Because wage norms do not respond in a linear or 
systematic way to any one measure of economic performance-for 
instance, they would respond less to a large spurt in the CPI coming 
from supply  shocks (1978-80) than  to an equivalent  increase  in the CPI 
associated with a sustained period of very low unemployment  (1966- 
69)-I  preferred  this procedure  to more  elaborate  ways one might  model 
norm  shifts. It has provided  an adequate,  simple  characterization  of the 
past. 
For the present episode, this model predicted  that the policy aimed 
persistently  at disinflation  would eventually  shift the wage norm  down- 
ward, but only after  imposing  unusually  great  or sustained  weakness in 
the real economy. Under these conditions, the wage norm equation 
would begin to exhibit  forecast errors  indicating  that wage norms  were 
shifting  downward. 
Most empirical studies of wage or price inflation have used past 
inflation  rates, rather  than the concept of wage norms, to help explain 
current inflation. The effect of lagged inflation in these models has 
generally  been interpreted  as representing  the influence  of inflationary 
expectations  on current  inflation,  where these expectations  are formed 
by an adaptive  process. In such  models,  developments  affecting  inflation 
continue  to have an influence  long after  they occur. And the effect of a 
sustained shock affecting inflation grows with the passage of time. 
Because the lagged  inflation  terms  directly  embody  long-run  and  expec- 
tational effects, a sustained macroeconomic  policy change is not ex- 
pected to alter  either  the constant  term  or the coefficients  of the equation 
relating  output  and  inflation. 
2. Perry, "Inflation  in Theory  and Practice."  Charles  Schultze  found  this character- 
ization  of norm  changes  explained  inflation  throughout  the  peacetime  years  of this  century. 
See Charles  L. Schultze, "Some Macro  Foundations  for Micro  Theory,"  BPEA,  2:1981, 
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New classical models differ  in important  respects from either of the 
modelsjust  described.  They  reject  adaptive  expectations  as a description 
of how future  price  expectations  are  formed.  Generally  they relate  these 
expectations  to the policies that are anticipated,  but that idea has never 
been implemented  in a widely accepted way in a predictive equation. 
The problem  is in determining  what economic agents expect policy to 
be and what amount of inflation  they think will accompany it. These 
models also hypothesize  that markets  always clear and that in doing so 
they incorporate  expected  future  prices  in an important  way. In the pure 
form  of such models, levels of output  and  employment  deviate from  full 
employment  levels only because economic agents are mistaken  about 
policy now and in the future. They interpret  the very flat short-run 
Phillips  curve estimated  from historical  data  as a reflection  of mistakes 
by economic agents  resulting  from  unpredictable  policies. 
The central  policy implication  of this theory is that policy should  be 
steady and predictable,  a prescription  usually  interpreted  as supporting 
monetarism.  According  to the theory, the mistakes  of economic agents 
would be minimized under such a policy and the short-run  relation 
between output and unemployment  would become very steep. If the 
monetary  policy change  of 1979  was understood  as a change  to a steadier 
and more disinflationary  policy regime,  this theory predicted  that infla- 
tion would slow more promptly and output and employment would 
decline less than  historical  equations  would  forecast. 
A version of this theory associated primarily  with William  Fellner 
stresses the credibility  of policy in a more  general  way.3  In this version, 
what matters is that policy convincingly  promises it will not tolerate 
inflation,  quite  apart  from  precisely  how policy is conducted  in the short 
run.  The credibility  hypothesis  also anticipated  that  the change  in policy 
regime  in 1979,  once widely believed, would bring  down inflation  more 
promptly  and with a smaller  loss of output  and employment  than  would 
be predicted  by empirical  models fit to historical  periods. And further- 
more, it predicts  that  the coefficients  relating  output  and inflation  in the 
short run will change under a consistent policy, making  the apparent 
Phillips  curve steeper. 
As these formulations  suggest, some of the important,  distinctive 
predictions  of these alternative  hypotheses could be tested only after  a 
complete cycle of disinflation  and subsequent  recovery, when it would 
3.  William  Fellner,  Towards  a  Reconstruction  of  Macroeconomics:  Problems  of 
Theory and Policy (American Enterprise Institute,  1976), pp. 116-18. 592  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
be possible to observe whether  the short-run  relations  between output 
and inflation  had changed  and whether  a new inflation  norm had been 
established.  One implication  of those theories that stress expectations 
of policy should  be testable already:  they promised  that a clear policy 
commitment  to disinflation  would yield better results-measured  as 
more prompt  disinflation  and more disinflation  relative to the increase 
in  unemployment-than  models  based  on past  experience  would  predict. 
In this paper,  I review how the actual  path  of inflation  during  the past 
few years compares with the path predicted  by some equations fit to 
historical  data. I also look at some disaggregated  evidence about  where 
wage disinflation  has been most pronounced  and how that experience 
compares  with  the past. These comparisons  should  indicate  whether  the 
economic  performance  of this period  supports  the claim  that  the change 
in monetary policy initiated in 1979 has speeded up the disinflation 
process. 
It should be noted that, if expectations  are simply  formed  by actual 
experience, there is no useful distinction  between the wage norm and 
credibility hypotheses in their predictions for the present period of 
disinflation.  Both would then require  an extended period of low actual 
inflation,  brought  about by an extended depression  in economic condi- 
tions, in order  to shift wage inflation  downward  by more than  just the 
predicted  cyclical response. There is no quantitative  prediction  about 
how large such an eventual shift down might  be. If equations  that rely 
on lagged inflation  to capture  long-run  or expectational  effects should 
overpredict  in such a period, it would be evidence of a more favorable 
outcome than  average  past behavior  would  predict. 
Wage Inflation 
The present disinflation  is first  examined  by looking at the behavior 
of wages. Because wage  costs represent  about  two-thirds  of value  added 
in the economy, wage  behavior  is the main  determinant  of business  costs 
and  hence of the underlying  trend  in price  inflation  in most sectors  of the 
economy. 
ECONOMY-WIDE  WAGES 
Table  2 compares  the actual  increases  in the average  hourly  earnings 
index with the increase  predicted  by two closely related  wage equations George L. Perry  593 
Table 2.  Actual and Predicted Wage Changes, 1979:1 to 1983:2a 
Percent 
Equation  2-1  Equation  2-2 
Actual  Predicted  Predicted 
Period  change  change  Error  change  Error 
In sample 
1979:1  7.9  8.1  -0.2  8.0  -  0.0 
2  6.6  8.4  -  1.8  8.5  -  1.8 
3  8.1  8.3  -0.2  8.2  -0.1 
4  8.0  8.4  -0.4  8.4  -0.5 
1980:1  9.0  8.3  0.7  8.3  0.7 
Out of sample 
1980:2  9.3  7.8  1.5  8.0  1.4 
3  8.6  8.0  0.6  8.3  0.3 
4  9.8  7.9  1.9  8.3  1.5 
1981:1  9.4  7.9  1.5  8.2  1.2 
2  7.6  7.7  -0.1  7.9  -  0.2 
3  8.1  7.4  0.7  7.5  0.6 
4  7.0  7.2  -- 0.2  7.1  -  0.2 
1982:1  6.8  6.9  -0.1  6.9  -  0.2 
2  5.8  6.4  -  0.6  6.4  -  0.5 
3  5.8  6.3  -  0.5  6.3  -  0.4 
4  4.7  6.0  -  1.3  5.9  -  1.2 
1983:1  5.2  5.8  -0.6  5.5  -0.3 
2  3.4  5.7  -  2.4  5.5  -  2.1 
Source: Estimations  by the author based on George  L. Perry,  'Inflation in Theory and Practice,"  BPEA,  1:1980, 
pp. 207-41. 
a.  Wage  changes  are measured  by  the  change  in the  log  of  the  average  hourly earnings  index.  Predicted  wage 
changes,  w, come  from the following  equations  (t  =  statistics  in parentheses): 
(2-1)  w  =  0.2  +  20.0U'  -  8.0U-1  +  0.2PL  +  dummies 
(4.5)  (-1.7)  (2.7) 
standard error of estimate,  0.8, 
(2-2)  w  =  0.6  +  25.3U-1  -  15.U-1  +  0.3PL +  dumnmies 
(5.9)  (-  3.7)  (4.3) 
standard error of estimate,  0.8, 
where U is the weighted unemployment  rate, and PL is the change in the log of the lagged CPI. The equations differ 
in how  historical  norm  shifts  were  modeled.  See  Perry,  "Inflation  in Theory  and Practice,"  for  further details. 
Equations 2-1 and 2-2 correspond,  respectively,  to equations  4-7 and 4-5 in that article. The sample period for both 
is  1954:1 to  1980:1. 
I presented  in my paper  cited above.4  The estimated  equations  explicitly 
allowed  for a norm  shift  after  the extended  demand  inflation  of the 1960s, 
and differ only in how they treat the transitional  quarters  of that shift 
statistically.  Allowing  for this shift sharply  reduced  the effect of lagged 
inflation  on current  wage changes compared  to the effect estimated  by 
4. Perry,  "Inflation  in Theory  and  Practice,"  p. 228,  equations  4-5  and  4-7. 594  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1983 
most conventional  models. In the model that underlies  the equations, 
substantial  and  sustained  prediction  errors  are thus  taken  as evidence of 
a norm  shift.5 
Under the new policy regime, which began in 1979:4,  wages at first 
rose somewhat faster than predicted, although  the average underpre- 
diction  in these first  six quarters  is only slightly  larger  than  the standard 
error  of the equations  of 0.8 percent  within  the sample  period.  Still, there 
is no sign  of exceptionally  prompt  disinflation  in these results. 
Before 1982:4  neither  equation  in table 2 shows evidence that wages 
were slowing  more  than  predicted.  Even the  overpredictions  from 1982:4 
and 1983:1  average only 0.75 and 0.95 percent in the equations, again 
little different  from their standard  errors of 0.8 percent. Only the 3.4 
percent rate of increase in average  hourly  earnings  in 1983:2  is signifi- 
cantly slower than predicted  by either equation.  One such observation 
is not important.  But if overpredictions  of the size in that quarter  are 
maintained,  they would  indicate  the wage norm  is shifting  downward. 
UNION  WAGES 
These recent developments in average wages have occurred in a 
climate of unprecedented  concessions in important  union wage con- 
tracts. Table 3 compares first-year  wage adjustments  in major union 
wage situations  in the present disinflation  with those adjustments  that 
occurred around earlier recessions. Because of long-term contracts, 
these first-year adjustments, which include changes under contract 
reopenings, are more sensitive indicators of developments in union 
wages than  are total effective adjustments  or other  averages  of all union 
wages. The three groups of years in the table chronicle developments 
around  the past three  business cycles, starting  with the last year before 
the downturn  in the economy. 
It is hard to draw inferences about the inflation  process from the 
episode of the early 1970s  because of the price controls  in effect in that 
period.  The President's  Pay Board  did  hold down and  roll  back wages in 
1972 and 1973 and the Dunlop committee was intensely involved in 
slowing wage settlements  in the construction  industry  during  the same 
5.  Ibid., pp. 207-41; and Arthur M. Okun, Prices and Quantities. George L. Perry  595 
Table 3.  First-Year Wage Adjustments and Average Hourly Earnings 
around Recessions, Selected Periods,  1969 through First Half of 1983 
Percent 
Percent of adjustments 
with no change or 
First-year  wage adjustmentsa  decline  Average 
Manufac-  Construc-  Manufac-  Construc-  hourly 
Year  turing  tion  Other  turing  tion  earnings 
1969  7.9  13.1  9.6  *  3  6.7 
1970  8.1  17.6  14.2  *  n.a.  6.6 
1971  10.9  12.6  12.2  1  n.a.  7.2 
1972b  6.6  6.9  8.2  2  6  6.2 
1973b  5.9  5.0  6.0  1  2  6.2 
1973b  5.9  5.0  6.0  1  2  6.2 
1974  8.7  11.0  10.2  1  1  8.0 
1975  9.8  8.0  11.9  3  8  8.4 
1976  8.9  6.1  8.6  *  11  7.2 
1977  8.4  6.3  8.0  3  4  7.6 
1979  6.9  8.8  7.6  *  *  8.0 
1980  7.4  13.6  9.5  *  *  9.0 
1981  7.2  13.5  9.8  13  1  9.1 
1982  2.8  6.5  4.3  52  15  6.8 
1983,  first 
half  -1.9  1.6  5.4  72  60  4.9c 
Source:  BLS,  Current Wage Developments,  various issues. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
* Less  than 0.5  percent. 
a.  Settlements  covering  one thousand or more workers. 
b.  Year of wage  controls. 
c.  Change from one  year earlier. 
period.6 That strategy was an alternative to the present attempt at 
disinflation  through monetary restraint alone. It has been criticized 
because  it distorted  relative  prices  in  the economy  and  because  aggregate 
restraint did not accompany the direct controls. Ultimately it was 
abandoned  under the inflationary  pressures of the supply shocks of 
1973-74. 
A cleaner comparison  is available  between the last two recessions. 
First-year  union  wage adjustments  jumped  up in 1974-75  when controls 
ended in an environment  of double-digit  inflation  rates stemming  from 
the food and energy price explosions. Thereafter, they slowed only 
6. The  committee  chaired  by John  T. Dunlop  was formally  known  as the Construction 
Industry  Stabilization  Committee. 596  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
slightly  in manufacturing  and substantially  outside manufacturing.  By 
comparison,  first-year  wage adjustments  have slowed dramatically  in 
recent quarters,  to the point of negative average  adjustments  in manu- 
facturing  in the first  half  of 1983. 
Table 4.  Employment Changes of Production Workers from Prerecession Year, 
Three Cycles, 1970 through First Half of 1983 
Percent 
Manufacturing  Con-  Total 
Cycle and  Durable  struc-  private 
year  Total  goods  tion  sector 
1970-73 
1970  -4.9  -6.9  -0.7  -0.1 
1971  - 8.3  -  11.4  2.0  -0.1 
1972  -4.9  -6.9  8.1  3.6 
1973  0.5  0.9  13.0  8.3 
1974-77 
1974  -  1.3  -0.8  -  3.3  1.2 
1975  -  12.1  -  13.4  -  17.5  -2.3 
1976  - 8.1  -9.3  -  17.4  1.3 
1977  -4.7  -4.8  -  11.3  5.7 
1980-83 
1980  -5.7  -7.3  -4.0  0.0 
1981  -6.9  -8.9  -8.8  0.9 
1982  -  15.1  -  19.3  -  14.6  -  1.3 
1983, first half  -  18.0  -  22.9  -  22.1  -2.7 
Source:  BLS,  Employment  and Earnings,  various  issues. 
The  difference  between  these adjustments,  which  cover major  unions, 
and broader  measures  of economy-wide  wage movements, such as the 
average  hourly  earnings  index shown in the table, shows that the wage 
slowdown  has been unusually  great  among  major  unions  this time, with 
union wages in manufacturing  and construction  under  especially great 
pressure. Indeed, the concentration  of wage pressures  is even greater 
than  the wage adjustments  reveal  because  of the composition  of changes 
within  all first-year  adjustments.  In 1982,  52 percent, and  in the first  half 
of 1983, 72 percent, of the wage adjustments  in manufacturing  repre- 
sented either no change or a decline in wage rates. What had been a 
negligible  phenomenon  in manufacturing  industries  in the past became 
a dominant  one in  this  recession. In  the  first  half  of 1983  an  unprecedented 
60 percent  of wage adjustments  in the construction  industry  showed no 
change  or decline. George L. Perry  597 
These unusual  wage developments  have corresponded  with the ex- 
ceptional and prolonged employment declines shown in table 4.  In 
durable  goods industries,  where the most publicized  wage concessions 
have occurred,  production  worker  employment  fell 24 percent  between 
1979  and the first  quarter  of 1983.  Over a comparable  period starting  in 
1973, the decline was only 8 percent. Even at its low point in 1975, 
employment  in durable  goods industries  was only 13 percent below its 
1973  level. This  correspondence  of extreme  wage  weakness  with  extreme 
employment weakness does  not support the idea that the present 
slowdown  in economy-wide  wage averages  is coming  from  any unusual 
expectations about macroeconomic  policy. Such policy expectations 
should,  presumably,  influence  wage decisions everywhere. 
Forecasting  Prices 
An additional  look at the present  disinflation  is provided  by examining 
price rather  than wage forecasts. Prices are more volatile than wages 
and, partly because of this, may reveal changes in the economy's 
response  to recent  policy that  are not yet apparent  in wage statistics. To 
examine this possibility the disinflation  period is next examined using 
the  equation  for  the  fixed-weight  GNP  price  deflator  presented  previously 
by Gordon and King.7  This equation utilizes a distributed  lag of past 
inflation  rates, rather  than  explicit norm  shifts, to capture  long-run  and 
expectational  effects. 
The main source of instability  in the Gordon-King  equation  appears 
to come from three variables capturing  the effects of certain relative 
prices, including  the prices of foreign  traded  goods: the relative prices 
of food and energy, the relative  price of total imports,  and the effective 
exchange  rate. In view of this instability,  three  forms  of the equation  are 
used, with each estimated  for the original  data period, 1954:2  to 1980:4 
(shown  in footnote a of table  5). In addition  to the independent  variables 
shown, each equation  includes  variables  for the minimum  wage rate, the 
effective social security  tax rate, and dummy  variables  for the period  of 
Nixon price controls. These had little or no effect in the forecast period 
and  are omitted  for simplicity. 
Equation 5-1 is the previously published Gordon-King  equation, 
which is reestimated  here with the recently revised national  accounts 
7. Robert J. Gordon and Stephen R. King, "The Output Cost of Disinflation  in 
Traditional  and  Vector  Autoregressive  Models,"  BPEA, 1:1982,  pp. 205-42. 598  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
Table  5. Predicted  and Actual  Inflation  Rates,  Fixed  Weight  GNP  Deflator, 
Selected  Periods,  1980:4  through  1983:2 
Percent 
1980:4-1981:4  1981:4-1982.:4  1982  :4-1983:2 
Actual change  8.8  5.1  3.9 
Forecast 
Equation  5-1  6.2  4.2  3.1 
Equation  5-2  7.4  4.3  2.8 
Equation  5-3  8.4  5.6  4.5 
Errors  (actual  minus 
forecast) 
Equation  5-1  2.6  0.9  0.8 
Equation  5-2  1.4  0.8  1.1 
Equation  5-3  0.4  -0.5  -0.6 
Source:  Estimations  provided  by  Robert  J.  Gordon,  as  described  in the  text,  based  on  Robert J.  Gordon  and 
Stephen  R.  King,  "The  Output  Cost  of  Disinflation  in  Traditional  and  Vector  Autoregressive  Models,"  BPEA, 
1:1982, pp. 205-42. 
a.  The  coefficients  on  the  main  independent  variables  in the  price  equations  are  shown  below;  all are logs  or 
changes  in logs  and all are significant at the 5 percent  level.  For simplicity,  some additional variables of little or no 
importance  in the forecast  period are not  shown.  See  the first equation  in table 2 of Gordon and King,  p. 218, for 
the detailed  specifications.  The  dependent  variable  in each  case  is  the change  in the log of  the fixed weight  GNP 
price deflator. 
Independent  variables 
Stan- 
Lagged inflation  Food  dard 
Produc-  and  Ex-  error 
Equa-  1954:2-  1967:1-  Output  tivity  energy  Inport  change  of esti- 
tion  1966:4  1980:4  ratio  growth  prices  prices  rate  mation 
5-1  0.92  1.04  0.36  -0.15  0.44  0.06  -0.13  0.803 
5-2  0.97  1.08  0.35  -  0.23  0.10  0.10  -  0.08  0.862 
5-3  0.94  1.10  0.36  -0.21  0.21  0.08  ...  0.857 
data.  Equation  5-2  uses the exchange  rate  over the 1961-80  period  rather 
thanjust  the 1975-80  period  used in 5-1. Equation  5-3  drops  the exchange 
rate variable  altogether  and relies on food and energy prices and total 
import  prices to capture  foreign  trade  price  effects. 
The actual inflation  rates in the postsample  period and the dynamic 
forecasts  from  the three  equations  are compared  in table  5. As shown in 
the wage equation of table 2, prices rise faster than predicted in the 
earliest  period  shown, in this case 1981.  Both 5-1 and  5-2 reveal that the 
inflation  slowdown  has been, if anything,  disappointingly  small  through- 
out. Only equation  5-3, which omits the exchange  rate  and relies on the 
variables  for relative  import  prices  and  food and  energy  prices  to capture 
the effects of foreign  prices, predicts  more inflation  than  occurred,  and 
its overpredictions  are very small  and do not occur until 1982.  Thus in 
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Table 6.  Predicted Effect of Individual Variables on Inflation Rate, Selected Periods, 
1980:4 through 1983:2 
Percentage points 
1980:4-  1981:4-  1982:4- 
Variable  Equation  1981:4  1982:4  1983:2 
Output  ratio  5-1  -  1.4  - 3.1  - 3.8 
5-2  -  1.5  - 3.2  -4.0 
5-3  -  1.5  -3.3  -4.1 
Productivity  growth  5-1  0.1  -0.2  -0.3 
5-2  0.1  -0.3  -0.3 
5-3  0.1  -0.3  -0.3 
Food and energy prices  5-1  -0.3  -0.2  -0.9 
5-2  -0.1  0.0  -0.3 
5-3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.5 
Import  prices  5-1  0.0  -0.6  -0.8 
5-2  -0.1  -  1.0  -  1.2 
5-3  0.0  -0.9  -  1.2 
Exchange  rate  5-1  -1.6  -1.3  -0.6 
5-2  - 0.7  -  1.0  -  1.3 
5-3  ...  ...  ... 
Addendum 
All relative  price 
variables  5-1  -  1.8  - 2.2  - 2.3 
5-2  -0.8  -2.1  -2.9 
5-3  -0.2  -  1.0  -  1.6 
Source:  Same  as table  5. 
credibility  hypothesis  in  connection  with  the  present  policy  of disinflation 
or pointing  to a downward  shift  in inflation  norms  greater  than  historical 
equations  would  predict. 
Table 6 identifies the contribution  of the individual independent 
variables  to the slowdown  in  inflation  predicted  by the Gordon  equations. 
The table shows how much  inflation  should  have changed  as a result of 
the independent  variables taking on their actual values since 1979:4 
rather than the unemployment rate staying constant at 6 percent, 
productivity  rising at its trend rate, and all relative prices remaining 
unchanged. The estimates shown allow for both the direct effect on 
inflation  of the change  in each variable,  and  its effect acting  through  the 
lagged inflation  rate which is endogenous  in the projection  period. By 
the first  half of 1983  the shortfall  of output  below trend  accounted  for a 
slowdown in inflation of  about 4 percentage points in each of the 600  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1983 
equations.  This is the minimum  effect that can be attributed  directly  to 
the disinflationary  policy. 
The effects of  the three relative price variables account for an 
additional  2.9 to 1.6 percentage points of disinflation,  depending on 
which equation  is used. If these effects too are credited  to the policy of 
the period,  that  policy has reduced  the inflation  rate  by an estimated  6.9 
to 5.6 percentage  points, producing  the forecast  errors  shown in table 5. 
Food and energy prices had already  slowed during  1980. So almost all 
these relative  price  effects come from  import  prices  and, when it is used, 
the exchange rate variable. Thus part of these anti-inflation  benefits 
come at the expense of corresponding  pro-inflationary  pressures  on the 
countries  whose dollar  exchange  rates  declined.  And  they are  reversible 
if the exchange  rate  moves back  toward  its level in earlier  years. 
The Inflation Process and Policy 
Monetary  policymakers  since 1979  have shown historically  unusual 
determination  to fight inflation  and willingness  to raise unemployment 
in the process. Although  many issues remain,  this experience has shed 
light on some questions about the inflationary  process and the costs of 
disinflation. Developments have certainly not supported the central 
promise  of some  classical  models  that  once steady  disinflationary  policies 
are in place, disinflation  will take place with little output loss.  The 
disinflation  that  occurred  was not  exceptionally  prompt,  and  when  wages 
finally did slow by unusually large amounts in some manufacturing 
industries and construction, that development was accompanied by 
unusually  large  declines in employment. 
CREDIBILITY  VERSUS  AUSTERITY 
No measure exists of what private decisionmakers  thought about 
policy aims in this period. Because of this, one could argue that the 
promised  benefits  of credible  disinflationary  policy have not been real- 
ized because the credibility of anti-inflation  policy has never been 
established. However, the Federal  Reserve has certainly  worked hard 
to establish its credibility.  It persisted  in its restrictive  policies, imple- 
mented  through  money supply  targets,  long after  its predecessors  would George L. Perry  601 
have turned  to fighting  recession. And in the spring  of 1983  it already 
moved to  restrain the expansion only months after it began. The 
commitment  to fighting  inflation  has been more clear and credible  than 
ever before  in the postwar  era. 
Ultimately determination  should pay off. The evidence about the 
slowdown in inflation  that has finally  occurred  in 1983  is still unclear. 
But in my mind,  the biggest  surprise  will be if inflation  does not slow by 
more  than  the cyclical  wage  equations  predict.  Wage  norms  have shifted 
upward  in the past under sustained  periods of prosperity  and cyclical 
inflation, and they should shift downward now under the opposite, 
sustained  condition. In the current  period it is hard  to distinguish  this 
prediction  from those of the credibility  hypothesis if the latter require 
the  actual  experience  of an  extended  slump  to establish  policy  credibility. 
But  in this  case, it has no distinctive  implications  for policy. Only  if there 
is an important  difference  between  credibility  and  austerity  is the former 
of any special  interest. 
The predictions  from the Gordon-King  price equation  (5-3) must be 
interpreted  differently  from either of these views. That equation  does 
not hypothesize norm shifts, but does continuously  shift the short-run 
Phillips  curve  through  an  accelerationist  lagged  dependent  variable.  One 
interpretation  of the equation's  modest underpredictions  of inflation  in 
recent  quarters-in specifications  that  use the full array  of relative  price 
variables, including  the exchange rate-is  that the high elasticity of 
lagged  inflation  exaggerates  the speed and size of the reaction  of actual 
inflation  to its recent past. Alternatively,  if that specification  is correct, 
disinflation  in the recent period  must be interpreted  as disappointingly 
slow. In any case, the prediction  errors  are  not large  and  lend  no support 
to the view that credible  policy has speeded up the disinflation  process 
and  made  it less costly. 
THE  LONGER  RUN 
Some important  messages  for  theory  and  policy may  not be clear  until 
and unless policy allows a sustained recovery in economic activity. 
Presumably,  the implicit  hope in the present disinflation  policy is not 
only that inflation  might  be sharply  reduced,  if not ended, but also that 
high employment might then be  resumed without returning  to  the 
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are at least partially optimistic on this point, though for different 
underlying  reasons. But they do offer somewhat  different  prospects  for 
output  and inflation  in the longer  run. The new classical models predict 
that, under  the appropriate  policy regime,  the cyclical relation  between 
inflation  and  unemployment  will  change  and  maintained  full  employment 
will be compatible with price stability. The absence thus far of the 
disinflation  predicted  by these models casts doubt  on this prediction  as 
well. 
The inflation-output  relation may, in fact, not be sensitive to the 
policy regime.  As the historical  studies  by Gordon  and  by Schultze  have 
shown,  these coefficients  have  been surprisingly  invariant  to the  differing 
policy regimes that have prevailed  during  this century.8  If it turns out 
that  inflation  cannot  be controlled  sufficiently  without  continually  hold- 
ing back expansion, then other  programs  for dealing  more  directly  with 
inflation  may have to be put  back on the policy agenda. 
RECENT  POLICY 
Whatever  lessons emerge  for the longer  run,  the decision to turn  to a 
severely restrictive  monetary  policy in 1979  must  be viewed against  the 
economic  risks  that  then existed. Energy  prices  were rising  very rapidly 
in 1979  and 1980.  Inflationary  psychology  had  apparently  spread  to other 
volatile markets, and wages were accelerating.  Even with the turn to 
restrictive  policies and  the recession  that  ensued, wages rose faster  than 
predicted  in 1980.  Without  that  policy shift,  faster  inflation  would  almost 
surely have become imbedded  in the economy, and very likely a still 
faster  and  more  stubborn  wage norm  and  underlying  inflation  rate  would 
have resulted. 
Once that acceleration  was interrupted,  as it was by 1981,  the costs 
and  benefits  of continuing  the restrictive  monetary  policy became more 
debatable.  Reasonable  observers  can and do differ  about  how long and 
how much to depress the economy in order to reduce inflation. The 
results presented here suggest that we have gotten about what would 
have been predicted  from past experience,  just more of it because this 
recession was longer  and  deeper  than  others. 
8. Robert J. Gordon, "A Consistent  Characterization  of a Near-Century  of Price 
Behavior,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  70 (May  1980, Papers  and Proceedings, 
1979),  pp.  243-49;  and  Charles  L. Schultze,  "Some  Macro  FoundationsforMicro  Theory.  " 